A model of pre-game communication
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Publication:1332707
DOI10.1006/jeth.1994.1047zbMath0806.90132OpenAlexW2400215961WikidataQ57320389 ScholiaQ57320389MaRDI QIDQ1332707
Publication date: 5 September 1994
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/902697n7
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