A model of pre-game communication

DOI10.1006/JETH.1994.1047zbMATH Open0806.90132OpenAlexW2400215961WikidataQ57320389 ScholiaQ57320389MaRDI QIDQ1332707FDOQ1332707

Authors: Matthew Rabin 

Publication date: 5 September 1994

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/902697n7

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zbMATH Keywords

Pareto-efficient equilibriatwo-player complete-information game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cited In (26)

• Signaling games
• A suggested interpretation of some experimental results on preplay communication
• A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk
• When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? An experimental analysis
• Guessing the game: an individual's awareness and assessment of a game's existence
• Introduction to experimental game theory
• Cheap talk and cooperation in Stackelberg games
• The effects of costless pre-play communication: experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria
• Meaningful cheap talk must improve equilibrium payoffs
• Experimental cheap talk games: strategic complementarity and coordination
• Contract and game theory: basic concepts for settings with finite horizons
• Theories of coalitional rationality
• Pre-contest communication incentives
• How communication improves efficiency in bargaining games
• The power and limits of sequential communication in coordination games
• Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values
• Communication, cooperation and collusion in team tournaments -- an experimental study
• Valuable cheap talk and equilibrium selection
• Words versus actions as a means to influence cooperation in social dilemma situations
• Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions
• Intention or request: the impact of message structures
• How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information?
• Communication, correlation, and symmetry in bargaining
• Demanding or deferring? An experimental analysis of the economic value of communication with attitude
• Do actions speak louder than words? An experimental comparison of observation and cheap talk
• A note on pre-play communication

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