A note on pre-play communication

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.02.008MaRDI QIDQ523513zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Joel Sobel

Publication date 21 April 2017

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.008

zbMATH Keywords

communicationdominanceequilibrium selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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Cites work

• Average behavior in learning models
• Cheap talk, coordination, and evolutionary stability
• Co-ordination, spillovers, and cheap talk
• Communication between rational agents
• Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium
• Communication, risk, and efficiency in games
• Comparative Statics, Informativeness, and the Interval Dominance Order
• Equilibrium refinements in sender-receiver games
• Evolutionary stability in games of communication
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4167875 (Why is no real title available?)
• Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• Multi-sided pre-play communication by burning money
• Neighborhood stability in sender-receiver games
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Order independence for iterated weak dominance
• Persistent equilibria in strategic games
• Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
• Self-serving cheap talk: a test of Aumann's conjecture
• Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
• Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
• Timing of messages and the Aumann conjecture: a multiple-selves approach

Cited in

(7)

• A model of pre-game communication
• Communication, risk, and efficiency in games
• Multi-sided pre-play communication by burning money
• Language and coordination games
• Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity
• Coordination via delay: theory and experiment
• Communication and standoff

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