A note on pre-play communication

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.008zbMath1409.91053OpenAlexW2592552726MaRDI QIDQ523513

Joel Sobel

Publication date: 21 April 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.008

zbMATH Keywords

communicationequilibrium selectiondominance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (3)

Coordination via delay: theory and experiment ⋮ Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity ⋮ Language and coordination games

Cites Work

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• Equilibrium refinements in sender-receiver games
• Order independence for iterated weak dominance
• Communication, risk, and efficiency in games
• Self-serving cheap talk: a test of Aumann's conjecture
• Neighborhood stability in sender-receiver games
• Multi-sided pre-play communication by burning money
• Comparative Statics, Informativeness, and the Interval Dominance Order
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria

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