Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
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Publication:5449867
DOI10.1111/j.0012-9682.2008.00819.xzbMath1132.91539OpenAlexW2155816519MaRDI QIDQ5449867
No author found.
Publication date: 19 March 2008
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/353790/1/__userfiles.soton.ac.uk_Users_nsc_mydesktop_selecting-cheap-talk-equilibria.pdf
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