Strategic information transmission with sender's approval
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2041079
DOI10.1007/s00182-021-00757-1zbMath1468.91024arXiv2001.07413OpenAlexW4285487617MaRDI QIDQ2041079
Jérôme Renault, Françoise Forges
Publication date: 15 July 2021
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2001.07413
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Some results on the existence of Nash equilibria for non-zero sum games with incomplete information
- Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade
- Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
- Cheap talk with an exit option: a model of exit and voice
- Sender-receiver games with cooperation
- The existence of equilibria in certain games, separation for families of convex functions and a theorem of Borsuk-Ulam type
- Cheap talk with an exit option: the case of discrete action space
- Solutions of irreflexive relations
- On Two-Player Repeated Games with Lack of Information on One Side and State-Independent Signalling
- Universal Mechanisms
- An Approach to Communication Equilibria
- Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
- Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
This page was built for publication: Strategic information transmission with sender's approval
