Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game
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Publication:3826381
DOI10.2307/2937851zbMath0672.90108OpenAlexW2031166759MaRDI QIDQ3826381
Publication date: 1989
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2937851
Related Items (20)
An experimental study of strategic information transmission ⋮ Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: the single-crossing case ⋮ Dynamics of the presidential veto: A computational analysis ⋮ Naive audience and communication bias ⋮ Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions ⋮ Signaling Games ⋮ Cheap talk with an exit option: a model of exit and voice ⋮ Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals ⋮ Communication in bargaining over decision rights ⋮ Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication ⋮ Refining cheap-talk equilibria ⋮ Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information ⋮ Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments ⋮ Modelling the role of information in elections ⋮ Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers ⋮ Strategic information transmission with sender's approval ⋮ Cheap talk can matter in bargaining ⋮ Credible debate equilibria ⋮ Cheap talk and burned money ⋮ Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games
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