Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.08.001zbMATH Open1282.91059OpenAlexW3124461994WikidataQ109043122 ScholiaQ109043122MaRDI QIDQ533083FDOQ533083
Authors: Yong-Cai Geng, Sumit K. Garg 
Publication date: 2 May 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.08.001
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communicationexistenceclustering of messagesfinite message spacehonest sendersnaive receiversnon-monotone receiver reactionreceiver skepticismsender exaggeration
Cites Work
- Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
- A Theory of Credibility
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Sequential Equilibria
- Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
- Strategic communication with lying costs
- Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
- Credulity, lies, and costly talk
- Naive audience and communication bias
- A two-person game of information transmission
- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
- Reputation and imperfect information
- Cheap talk, coordination, and evolutionary stability
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- Refining cheap-talk equilibria
- Evolutionary stability in games of communication
- Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game
- Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games
Cited In (29)
- Simple versus rich language in disclosure games
- The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: theory and experimental evidence
- Maximal miscommunication
- Communication under language barriers
- Only time will tell: credible dynamic signaling
- Cheap talk with prior-biased inferences
- Misperception and cognition in markets
- Communication with endogenous deception costs
- Cheap Talk and Editorial Control
- A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games
- Signaling Games
- Informal communication
- Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes
- Communication-enhancing vagueness
- Influential news and policy-making
- Competition in costly talk
- Eliciting private information with noise: the case of randomized response
- Information identification in different networks with heterogeneous information sources
- Non-uniqueness of equilibrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games
- Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions
- De-biasing strategic communication
- Naive audience and communication bias
- Strategic argumentation
- RANDOM AUTHORITY
- Rules and commitment in communication: an experimental analysis
- A reputation for honesty
- Credulity, lies, and costly talk
- Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest
- Propaganda and credulity
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