Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.08.001zbMath1282.91059OpenAlexW3124461994WikidataQ109043122 ScholiaQ109043122MaRDI QIDQ533083

Yong-Cai Geng, Sumit K. Garg

Publication date: 2 May 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.08.001

zbMATH Keywords

communicationexistenceclustering of messagesfinite message spacehonest sendersnaive receiversnon-monotone receiver reactionreceiver skepticismsender exaggeration

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items

Credulity, lies, and costly talk ⋮ Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest ⋮ Naive audience and communication bias ⋮ Signaling Games ⋮ De-biasing strategic communication ⋮ Cheap Talk and Editorial Control ⋮ A reputation for honesty ⋮ Influential news and policy-making ⋮ Non-uniqueness of equilibrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games ⋮ Competition in costly talk ⋮ Misperception and cognition in markets ⋮ Communication with endogenous deception costs ⋮ Only time will tell: credible dynamic signaling ⋮ Cheap talk with prior-biased inferences ⋮ Strategic argumentation ⋮ RANDOM AUTHORITY ⋮ Communication under language barriers ⋮ Eliciting private information with noise: the case of randomized response ⋮ The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: theory and experimental evidence ⋮ Propaganda and credulity ⋮ Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes ⋮ Information identification in different networks with heterogeneous information sources ⋮ Maximal miscommunication ⋮ Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions ⋮ Simple versus rich language in disclosure games ⋮ Communication-enhancing vagueness

Cites Work

• Naive audience and communication bias
• A two-person game of information transmission
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Refining cheap-talk equilibria
• Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
• Cheap talk, coordination, and evolutionary stability
• Evolutionary stability in games of communication
• Credulity, lies, and costly talk
• Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Strategic Communication with Lying Costs
• A Theory of Credibility
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game
• Sequential Equilibria
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
• Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games
• Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria

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