Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
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Cites work
- A Theory of Credibility
- A two-person game of information transmission
- Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games
- Cheap talk, coordination, and evolutionary stability
- Credulity, lies, and costly talk
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- Evolutionary stability in games of communication
- Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
- Naive audience and communication bias
- Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
- Refining cheap-talk equilibria
- Reputation and imperfect information
- Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
- Sequential Equilibria
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Strategic communication with lying costs
- Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game
Cited in
(30)- Signaling games
- Eliciting private information with noise: the case of randomized response
- Communication under language barriers
- Information identification in different networks with heterogeneous information sources
- Influential news and policy-making
- Cheap talk and editorial control
- Informal communication
- Credulity, lies, and costly talk
- Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes
- A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games
- Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions
- Communication with endogenous deception costs
- The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: theory and experimental evidence
- Simple versus rich language in disclosure games
- Communication-enhancing vagueness
- A reputation for honesty
- On the cardinality of the message space in sender-receiver games
- Only time will tell: credible dynamic signaling
- Competition in costly talk
- De-biasing strategic communication
- Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest
- Rules and commitment in communication: an experimental analysis
- Maximal miscommunication
- Naive audience and communication bias
- Propaganda and credulity
- Non-uniqueness of equilibrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games
- Random authority
- Misperception and cognition in markets
- Cheap talk with prior-biased inferences
- Strategic argumentation
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