Cheap Talk and Editorial Control

DOI10.1515/bejte-2013-0002zbMath1375.91039OpenAlexW2004261113WikidataQ66708785 ScholiaQ66708785MaRDI QIDQ4588465

Jonathan Newton

Publication date: 26 October 2017

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2123/8896

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talkWikipediaeditorial control

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (3)

Bertrand oligopoly with boundedly rational consumers ⋮ On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games ⋮ Expert panels with selective investigation

Cites Work

• Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
• Naive audience and communication bias
• Comparative cheap talk
• Credulity, lies, and costly talk
• A Model of Expertise
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk

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