Cheap talk and editorial control

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2013-0002MaRDI QIDQ4588465zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Jonathan Newton

Publication date 26 October 2017

Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/2123/8896

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talkeditorial controlWikipedia

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Applications of game theory (91A80)

Recommendations

• Dynamic cheap talk with static informational control
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information
• Hierarchical cheap talk
• Competitive cheap talk

Cites work

• A model of expertise
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Comparative cheap talk
• Credulity, lies, and costly talk
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• Naive audience and communication bias
• Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
• Strategic Information Transmission

Cited in

(3)

• Bertrand oligopoly with boundedly rational consumers
• On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games
• Expert panels with selective investigation

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