Authority and Communication in Organizations
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Publication:4419346
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00227zbMath1040.91094MaRDI QIDQ4419346
Publication date: 13 August 2003
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
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