Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.06.008MaRDI QIDQ2437802zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pinghan Liang

Publication date 13 March 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/45271/1/MPRA_paper_45271.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

hierarchiesdelegationintermediary

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• Optimal Delegation
• Transfer of authority within hierarchies
• Optimal contingent delegation
• The theory of optimal delegation with an application to tariff caps
• Optimal sequential delegation

Cites work

• A Model of Delegated Project Choice
• A model of expertise
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Communication via a strategic mediator
• Continuity in mechanism design without transfers
• Hierarchical cheap talk
• How to talk to multiple audiences
• Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
• Optimal Delegation
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Optimal limited authority for principal
• Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case
• Strategic Information Transmission
• The Economics of Clear Advice and Extreme Options
• The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing
• Transfer of authority within hierarchies
• Veto-based delegation

Cited in

(9)

• Optimal sequential delegation
• Optimal contingent delegation
• Transfer of authority within hierarchies
• The organization of supplier networks: effects of delegation and intermediation.
• The theory of optimal delegation with an application to tariff caps
• Optimal Delegation
• Benefiting from bias: delegating to encourage information acquisition
• A cooperative bargaining framework for decentralized portfolio optimization
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7361818 (Why is no real title available?)

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