Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.008zbMath1282.91176MaRDI QIDQ2437802

Pinghan Liang

Publication date: 13 March 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/45271/1/MPRA_paper_45271.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

delegation; hierarchies; intermediary

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

90B50: Management decision making, including multiple objectives

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

Related Items

Optimal sequential delegation, A cooperative bargaining framework for decentralized portfolio optimization, Transfer of authority within hierarchies

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