Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.06.008zbMATH Open1282.91176OpenAlexW2090519926MaRDI QIDQ2437802FDOQ2437802

Pinghan Liang

Publication date: 13 March 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/45271/1/MPRA_paper_45271.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

hierarchiesdelegationintermediary

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
• A model of expertise
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Continuity in mechanism design without transfers
• Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case
• Optimal limited authority for principal
• The Economics of Clear Advice and Extreme Options
• Optimal Delegation
• Veto-based delegation
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing
• Communication via a strategic mediator
• How to talk to multiple audiences
• Hierarchical cheap talk
• A Model of Delegated Project Choice
• Transfer of authority within hierarchies

Cited In (5)

• Transfer of authority within hierarchies
• A cooperative bargaining framework for decentralized portfolio optimization
• Optimal sequential delegation
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Optimal contingent delegation

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