Veto-based delegation

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2007.02.004zbMATH Open1140.91344OpenAlexW2165722851MaRDI QIDQ936643FDOQ936643

Authors: Tymofiy Mylovanov 

Publication date: 19 August 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.004

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zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationimplementationveto powerdelegationprincipal-agent relationshipno monetary transfers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Strategic Information Transmission
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (13)

• Countervailing conflicts of interest in delegation games
• Eliciting information from a committee
• The role of commitment in bilateral trade
• Optimal sequential delegation
• Equilibrium informativeness in veto games
• Optimal signaling with cheap talk and money burning
• Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers
• Money burning in the theory of delegation
• Optimal limited authority for principal
• Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary
• Cheap talk with an exit option: a model of exit and voice
• Expert advising under checks and balances
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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