Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.06.008zbMath1169.91010OpenAlexW2122652492MaRDI QIDQ2271361

Tymofiy Mylovanov, Eugen Kováč

Publication date: 7 August 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22968

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talkoptimal delegationprincipal-agent relationshipno monetary transfersstochastic mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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• The Economics of Clear Advice and Extreme Options
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• Optimal Auction Design
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Optimal Delegation

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