Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.06.008zbMath1169.91010MaRDI QIDQ2271361

Tymofiy Mylovanov, Eugen Kováč

Publication date: 7 August 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22968

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talk; optimal delegation; principal-agent relationship; no monetary transfers; stochastic mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B06: Decision theory

91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory

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