Delegation and nonmonetary incentives

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2017.06.002zbMath1400.91276OpenAlexW3122893710MaRDI QIDQ2402061

Georgy Egorov, Attila Ambrus

Publication date: 6 September 2017

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10161/13207

zbMATH Keywords

delegationmoney burningorganizational procedures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items

Money burning in the theory of delegation, Optimal signaling with cheap talk and money burning, Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers, Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions, Communication in bargaining over decision rights, Resisting persuasion, Repeated delegation

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