A Model of Delegated Project Choice
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Publication:5190485
DOI10.3982/ECTA7965zbMath1202.91138OpenAlexW2130811792MaRDI QIDQ5190485
Mark Armstrong, John M. Vickers
Publication date: 18 March 2010
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta7965
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