Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production

DOI10.1007/S00199-016-1021-0MaRDI QIDQ1707313zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Raphael Boleslavsky, Christopher Cotton

Publication date 29 March 2018

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/274669/files/qed_wp_1343.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

all-pay auctioncompetitive Bayesian persuasiongeneral lotto gamelobbyingproject selectionsearch for evidence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) 2-person games (91A05) Positional games (pursuit and evasion, etc.) (91A24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Project selection: commitment and competition
• Competition in persuasion: an experiment
• Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
• Competition in persuasion
• Competitive disclosure of correlated information

Cites work

• A Model of Delegated Project Choice
• Allocation games with caps: from Captain Lotto to all-pay auctions
• An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Campaign spending regulation in a model of redistributive politics
• Choosing fair lotteries to defeat the competition
• Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote
• Decision rules revealing commonly known events
• Discrete Colonel Blotto and general lotto games
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
• Evidence disclosure and verifiability
• Information gatekeepers: theory and experimental evidence
• Information Transmission--Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria
• Majoritarian Blotto contests with asymmetric battlefields: an experiment on apex games
• Non-symmetric discrete General Lotto games
• Persuasion as a contest
• Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
• Signal orderings based on dispersion and the supply of private information in auctions
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• The Colonel Blotto game
• The non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game
• The war of information
• Waging simple wars: a complete characterization of two-battlefield Blotto equilibria

Cited in

(13)

• Centralized policymaking and informational lobbying
• Competitive disclosure of correlated information
• Persuasion with costly precision
• Threshold tests as quality signals: optimal strategies, equilibria, and Price of anarchy
• Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
• Informational benefits of managerial myopia
• Project selection: commitment and competition
• Long information design
• Competitive information disclosure in random search markets
• ENTREPRENEUR–INVESTOR INFORMATION DESIGN
• Endogenous threshold selection with two-interval restricted tests
• Mapping an information design game into an all-pay auction
• On the possibility of strategic ignorance in sequential persuasion

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