Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production
DOI10.1007/S00199-016-1021-0zbMATH Open1400.91091OpenAlexW2240354238MaRDI QIDQ1707313FDOQ1707313
Authors: Raphael Boleslavsky, Christopher Cotton 
Publication date: 29 March 2018
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/274669/files/qed_wp_1343.pdf
Recommendations
project selectionall-pay auctionlobbyingcompetitive Bayesian persuasiongeneral lotto gamesearch for evidence
Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) 2-person games (91A05) Positional games (pursuit and evasion, etc.) (91A24)
Cites Work
- Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
- The Colonel Blotto game
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- Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
- A Model of Delegated Project Choice
- Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote
- Majoritarian Blotto contests with asymmetric battlefields: an experiment on apex games
- Information gatekeepers: theory and experimental evidence
Cited In (11)
- Centralized policymaking and informational lobbying
- Project selection: commitment and competition
- Persuasion with costly precision
- Competitive disclosure of correlated information
- Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
- Long information design
- Threshold tests as quality signals: optimal strategies, equilibria, and Price of anarchy
- Informational benefits of managerial myopia
- Endogenous threshold selection with two-interval restricted tests
- Competitive information disclosure in random search markets
- ENTREPRENEUR–INVESTOR INFORMATION DESIGN
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