Evidence disclosure and verifiability

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2003.12.002MaRDI QIDQ705843zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jesse Bull, Joel Watson

Publication date 16 February 2005

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6th0060j

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionsimplementationcontractsexternal enforcement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Recommendations

• Costly Evidence Production and the Limits of Verifiability
• Implementation with evidence
• Bayesian implementation with verifiable information
• A characterization of verifiability and observability in contracts
• Mechanisms with evidence: commitment and robustness

Cites work

• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Collusion, renegotiation and implementation
• Efficiency in partnerships with joint monitoring
• Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships
• Evidence production in adversarial vs. inquisitorial regimes
• Hard evidence and mechanism design
• Implementation and Renegotiation
• Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
• Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
• Strategic Information Revelation
• Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
• The burden of proof in a game of persuasion
• The renegotiation-proofness principle and costly renegotiation

Cited in

(20)

• Implementation with evidence
• Contract and game theory: basic concepts for settings with finite horizons
• A characterization of verifiability and observability in contracts
• Mechanism Design with Moderate Evidence Cost
• Bayesian implementation with verifiable information
• Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production
• Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide
• Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion
• COSTLY EVIDENCE AND SYSTEMS OF FACT-FINDING
• Costly Evidence Production and the Limits of Verifiability
• Persuasion and dynamic communication
• Evolving influence: mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships
• The renegotiation-proofness principle and costly renegotiation
• Implementation via rights structures
• Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
• Verifiable disclosure
• Hard evidence and mechanism design
• Implementation with partial provability
• Equilibrium refinement in finite action evidence games
• Fighting collusion: an implementation theory approach

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