The renegotiation-proofness principle and costly renegotiation

DOI10.3390/g4030347zbMath1314.91113MaRDI QIDQ2351234

Joel Watson, James R. Brennan

Publication date: 23 June 2015

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g4030347

zbMATH Keywords

contract theory; bargaining; mechanism design; negotiation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

Evidence disclosure and verifiability

Cites Work

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