Evidence disclosure and verifiability
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Publication:705843
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2003.12.002zbMath1093.91031OpenAlexW3123976389MaRDI QIDQ705843
Publication date: 16 February 2005
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6th0060j
Related Items
Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide ⋮ Hard evidence and mechanism design ⋮ Persuasion and dynamic communication ⋮ Equilibrium refinement in finite action evidence games ⋮ Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production ⋮ Implementation with partial provability ⋮ Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion ⋮ Implementation via rights structures ⋮ Implementation with evidence ⋮ Evolving influence: mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships ⋮ Mechanism design with partial state verifiability ⋮ COSTLY EVIDENCE AND SYSTEMS OF FACT-FINDING ⋮ Mechanism Design with Moderate Evidence Cost ⋮ The renegotiation-proofness principle and costly renegotiation ⋮ Contract and game theory: basic concepts for settings with finite horizons
Cites Work
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- Evidence production in adversarial vs. inquisitorial regimes
