Evidence disclosure and verifiability

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2003.12.002zbMath1093.91031MaRDI QIDQ705843

Joel Watson, Jesse Bull

Publication date: 16 February 2005

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6th0060j

zbMATH Keywords

coalitions; implementation; contracts; external enforcement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B38: Production theory, theory of the firm

Related Items

Implementation with partial provability, Hard evidence and mechanism design, Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion, Mechanism design with partial state verifiability, COSTLY EVIDENCE AND SYSTEMS OF FACT-FINDING, Mechanism Design with Moderate Evidence Cost

Cites Work

• Hard evidence and mechanism design
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• The burden of proof in a game of persuasion
• Efficiency in partnerships with joint monitoring
• Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
• The renegotiation-proofness principle and costly renegotiation
• Collusion, renegotiation and implementation
• Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
• Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships
• Strategic Information Revelation
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Implementation and Renegotiation
• Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
• Evidence production in adversarial vs. inquisitorial regimes