Implementation via rights structures
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Publication:1757583
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.04.009zbMATH Open1419.91272OpenAlexW2802826459WikidataQ129922523 ScholiaQ129922523MaRDI QIDQ1757583FDOQ1757583
Authors: Semih Koray, Kemal Yıldız 
Publication date: 15 January 2019
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11693/49904
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Cited In (14)
- Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form
- Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium
- Implementation via rights structures
- Implementation in strong core by codes of rights
- Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures
- Motives and implementation with rights structures
- Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?
- Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu-Hurwicz equilibrium
- Designing rotation programs: limits and possibilities
- Computational implementation
- Behavioral implementation under incomplete information
- Implementation with a sympathizer
- Robust coalitional implementation
- Well-designed incentive schemes: introduction to the special issue in honor of Semih Koray
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