Constitutional implementation.
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Publication:1811240
DOI10.1007/S100580200074zbMATH Open1048.91043OpenAlexW4232156455MaRDI QIDQ1811240FDOQ1811240
Authors: Bezalel Peleg, Eyal Winter 
Publication date: 2002
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580200074
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Cited In (14)
- Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium
- Implementation by mediated equilibrium
- Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
- The structure of unstable power mechanisms
- Implementation via rights structures
- A stability index for local effectivity functions
- Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?
- CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS UNDER AMBIGUITY: A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH
- Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions
- Maskin's theorem with limited veto power
- Binary games in constitutional form and collective choice
- Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences
- Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox.
- Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences
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