CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS UNDER AMBIGUITY: A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH

DOI10.1142/S0219198907001278MaRDI QIDQ5294341zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Marcello Basili, Fulvio Fontini

Publication date 24 July 2007

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

exploitationChoquet expected utilityconstitutional constraintsgames with ambiguity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Public goods game with ambiguous threshold
• Ambiguous act equilibria
• Constitutional implementation.
• On dynamic consistency in ambiguous games
• Public good provision with constitutional constraint

Cites work

• A Simple Axiomatization of Nonadditive Expected Utility
• Ambiguous games
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty: Breaking down backward induction
• Non-additive beliefs and strategic equilibria
• On the use of capacities in modeling uncertainty aversion and risk aversion
• PROBABILITY AND UNCERTAINTY: THE LEGACY OF GEORGESCU‐ROEGEN
• Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
• Theory of capacities
• E-capacities and the Ellsberg paradox

Cited in

(2)

• Representation of constitutions under incomplete information
• Public goods game with ambiguous threshold

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