CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS UNDER AMBIGUITY: A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH

DOI10.1142/S0219198907001278zbMATH Open1138.91382MaRDI QIDQ5294341FDOQ5294341

Authors: Marcello Basili, Fulvio Fontini 

Publication date: 24 July 2007

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

exploitationChoquet expected utilityconstitutional constraintsgames with ambiguity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
• Theory of capacities
• On the use of capacities in modeling uncertainty aversion and risk aversion
• Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty: Breaking down backward induction
• Non-additive beliefs and strategic equilibria
• Ambiguous games
• A Simple Axiomatization of Nonadditive Expected Utility
• \(E\)-capacities and the Ellsberg paradox
• PROBABILITY AND UNCERTAINTY: THE LEGACY OF GEORGESCU‐ROEGEN

Cited In (2)

• Representation of constitutions under incomplete information
• Public goods game with ambiguous threshold

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