Public goods game with ambiguous threshold

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2020.109165zbMath1436.91067OpenAlexW3017188110MaRDI QIDQ777685

Daiki Kishishita, Hiroyuki Ozaki

Publication date: 7 July 2020

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109165

zbMATH Keywords

public goodsambiguityChoquet expected utilitycollective action

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Search and Knightian uncertainty
• Strategic complements, substitutes, and Ambiguity: the implications for public goods.
• Monotone comparative statics in games with non-monotonic best-replies: contests and Cournot oligopoly
• Choice under uncertainty with the best and worst in mind: Neo-additive capacities
• An axiomatic approach to \(\varepsilon\)-contamination
• Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
• Economics of Pessimism and Optimism

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