Strategic complements, substitutes, and Ambiguity: the implications for public goods.
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Publication:1867536
DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2898zbMath1038.91003WikidataQ57918136 ScholiaQ57918136MaRDI QIDQ1867536
Jürgen Eichberger, David Kelsey
Publication date: 2 April 2003
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2898
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