Representation of constitutions under incomplete information
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Recommendations
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 53233 (Why is no real title available?)
- Binary effectivity rules
- Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights
- Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox.
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees
- Social choice and individual values
- Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions
Cited in
(9)- Stable constitutions
- Critical decisions and constitutional rules
- Channeling the final say in politics: a simple mechanism
- Representations of political power structures by strategically stable game forms: a survey
- On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions
- Constitutional implementation.
- In the beginning there were \(n\) agents: founding and amending a constitution
- Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions
- On robust constitution design
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