Stable constitutions

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2023.09.013zbMATH Open1530.91164OpenAlexW4387378432MaRDI QIDQ6148411FDOQ6148411

Semin Kim, Daeyoung Jeong

Publication date: 11 January 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.013

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityweighted majority rulesconstitutions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

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• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• PARETO EFFICIENCY AND WEIGHTED MAJORITY RULES
• Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions
• Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
• On the self-(in)stability of weighted majority rules
• A dynamic theory of electoral competition

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