On the self-(in)stability of weighted majority rules

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.10.010MaRDI QIDQ517007zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yaron Azrieli, Semin Kim

Publication date 16 March 2017

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.010

zbMATH Keywords

self-stabilityvoting rulesweighted majority rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
• Self-selection consistent functions
• Self-selective social choice functions
• Self-Selective Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorems

Cited in

(6)

• Evaluation of some weighted majority decision rules under dependent voting
• A note on restricted majority rules: Invariance to rule selection and outcome distinctiveness
• Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
• Stable constitutions
• Minimal stable voting rules
• Robust voting under uncertainty

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