Minimal stable voting rules

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2025.07.006MaRDI QIDQ6930630zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Héctor Hermida-Rivera

Publication date 12 September 2025

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GEB.2025.07.006

zbMATH Keywords

constitutionsminimal self-stabilityminimal stabilitypowervoting rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites work

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• Utility functions for simple games

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