The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility
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Publication:4146590
DOI10.2307/1911680zbMath0369.90135OpenAlexW1992201685MaRDI QIDQ4146590
Publication date: 1977
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uiuo.ark:/13960/t6qz38t6q
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