The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility

Cited in

(48)

Priority and choice probability estimation by ranking, rating and combined data
Outside options, component efficiency, and stability
Transversality of the Shapley value
Potential, value, and coalition formation
Voting, bargaining, and factor income distribution
Large games: Fair and stable outcomes
Weak values, the core, and new axioms for the Shapley value
Utility functions for simple games
On the symmetric and weighted Shapley values
A new axiomatization of the Shapley value
Decomposition of solutions and the Shapley value
The interval Shapley value of an M/M/1 service system
Weakly balanced contributions and solutions for cooperative games
Calculating direct and indirect contributions of players in cooperative games via the multi-linear extension
Potential, value, and random partitions
A value for partially defined cooperative games
On membership and marginal values
A Walrasian approach to bargaining games
The Shapley value without efficiency and additivity
On choosing which game to play when ignorant of the rules
Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games
The degree measure as utility function over positions in graphs and digraphs
Outside options in probabilistic coalition situations
SURF — STRUCTURAL UNDUPLICATED REACH AND FREQUENCY: LATENT CLASS TURF AND SHAPLEY VALUE ANALYSES
Game theory and power indices
A note on values and multilinear extensions
Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics
Nash bargaining, Shapley threats, and outside options
On the nucleolus as a power index
Analysis of regression in game theory approach
Antagonistic and bargaining games in optimal marketing decisions
Weak differential marginality and the Shapley value
The Banzhaf Value and General Semivalues for Differentiable Mixed Games
UNCERTAINTY OF THE SHAPLEY VALUE
On the predictive efficiency of the core solution in side-payment games
Rationing rules for risky claims
1-convex extensions of incomplete cooperative games and the average value
Cross invariance, the Shapley value, and the Shapley-Shubik power index
Sign properties and axiomatizations of the weighted division values
A connection between von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility and symmetric potential games
On weighted-egalitarian values for cooperative games with transferable utility
Combining the Shapley value and the equal division solution: an overview
Minimal stable voting rules
Atkinson-Shapley rules for TU-games: on the trade-off between efficiency and inequality
Degree centrality, von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility and externalities in networks
Moore interval subtraction and interval solutions for TU-games
Another characterization of the Owen value without the additivity axiom
Subjective evaluations of n-person games

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