Game theory and power indices

DOI10.1007/BF01282508MaRDI QIDQ3872244zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Hannu Nurmi

Publication date 1980

Published in Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueShapley-Shubik indexveto playerBanzhaf indexstable outcomesbargaining setsM-stabilitycomparison of indicescompetitive bargaining stabilitypresence of a vectorvoting power indices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80)

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3614533 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3214144 (Why is no real title available?)
• Generalised bargaining sets for cooperative games
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
• The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility
• The competitive bargaining set for cooperative \(n\)-person games
• Values of Large Games II: Oceanic Games
• Values of Large Games, I: A Limit Theorem

Cited in

(6)

• Strict proportional power in voting bodies
• Staying power in sequential games
• Powers of subgroups in voting bodies
• The burning coalition bargaining model
• Discrepancies in the outcomes resulting from different voting schemes
• The inverse problem for power distributions in committees

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