The competitive bargaining set for cooperative n-person games
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Publication:2562047
Cites work
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Cited in
(18)- Comparison of theories for payoff disbursement of coalition values
- A test of the core, bargaining set, kernel and Shapley models in N-person quota games with one weak player
- Domination structures and multicriteria problems in N-person games
- Bargaining sets with small coalitions
- A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
- The reactive bargaining set of some flow games and of superadditive simple games
- The semireactive bargaining set of a cooperative game
- The bargaining set of four-person balanced games
- Bargaining sets in cooperative games with limited communication
- Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel.
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4202067 (Why is no real title available?)
- On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games
- A note on the equal division kernel and the 뱉power model
- Game theory and power indices
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- Reactive and Semi-Reactive Bargaining Sets for Games with Restricted Cooperation
- Coincidence of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and the set of competitive equilibria in a continuum coalition production economy
- Notes on Ostrogorski's paradox
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