A game with no solution
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Publication:5540172
Cited in
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- ON BARGAINING BASED POINT SOLUTION TO COOPERATIVE TU GAMES
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- An existence result for farsighted stable sets of games in characteristic function form
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- Core stability in chain-component additive games
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- The competitive bargaining set for cooperative \(n\)-person games
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- Symmetric solutions for (n,n-2)-games with small values of nu(n-2)
- The coming of game theory
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- Some advances in cooperative game theory: indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach
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- Stable sets and max-convex decompositions of TU games
- Average rules for cooperative TU games
- A lattice fixed-point theorem with constraints
- An introduction to mechanized reasoning
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- Networks and stability
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- The Proof That a Game May Not Have a Solution
- Extendability and von neuman-morgenstern stability of the core
- Characterization of TU games with stable cores by nested balancedness
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