A game with no solution

DOI10.1090/S0002-9904-1968-11901-9zbMATH Open0157.51101OpenAlexW2067594649MaRDI QIDQ5540172FDOQ5540172

Authors: William F. Lucas 

Publication date: 1968

Published in: Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1090/s0002-9904-1968-11901-9

zbMATH Keywords

operations research

Cites Work

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Cited In (40)

• Algorithms for core stability, core largeness, exactness, and extendability of flow games
• On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
• Cooperative games with large cores
• ON BARGAINING BASED POINT SOLUTION TO COOPERATIVE TU GAMES
• A note on the relationship between the core and stable sets in three-sided markets
• Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games
• Finite Solution Theory for Coalitional Games
• An existence result for farsighted stable sets of games in characteristic function form
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions in the assignment market
• The myopic stable set for social environments
• Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games
• Social norms and core outcomes in a sharecropping economy
• Core stability in chain-component additive games
• The competitive bargaining set for cooperative \(n\)-person games
• Fair stable sets of simple games
• A dynamic solution concept for abstract games
• The coming of game theory
• Differential games with nonzero sum (cooperative variant)
• Symmetric solutions for (n,n-2)-games with small values of nu(n-2)
• Cores of convex games
• Stability of two player game structures
• Some advances in cooperative game theory: indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach
• Competition and collusion in bilateral markets
• A survey on assignment markets
• Absorbing set forn-person games
• Using Theorema in the Formalization of Theoretical Economics
• A Simple Game with No Symmetric Solution
• Cooperative games (von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets)
• Average rules for cooperative TU games
• A lattice fixed-point theorem with constraints
• Stable sets and max-convex decompositions of TU games
• An introduction to mechanized reasoning
• Networks and stability
• Symmetric solutions for symmetric games with large cores
• Cooperative game with agreements implemented by a third party
• An absorbing set for cooperative games
• The Proof That a Game May Not Have a Solution
• Extendability and von neuman-morgenstern stability of the core
• Characterization of TU games with stable cores by nested balancedness

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