The myopic stable set for social environments
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Cites work
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Cited in
(21)- The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games
- Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium
- Cautious farsighted stability in network formation games with streams of payoffs
- Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form
- Information, Bertrand-Edgeworth competition and the law of one price
- Matching with myopic and farsighted players
- Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs: a solution in pure strategies
- Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem
- Myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player strategic-form games
- Horizon-\(K\) farsightedness in criminal networks
- The myopic stable set for social environments
- Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core
- Inequalities and segregation: can welfarist local governments struggle against both simultaneously?
- Stability of alliance networks
- Designing rotation programs: limits and possibilities
- Myopic oligopoly pricing
- A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games
- Axiomatization and implementation via objections structures
- Network stability under limited foresight
- Do stable outcomes survive in marriage problems with myopic and farsighted players?
- Network formation with myopic and farsighted players
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