Myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player strategic-form games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.10.004MaRDI QIDQ2667285zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Francis Bloch, Anne van den Nouweland

Publication date 24 November 2021

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.10.004

zbMATH Keywords

corefarsighted stable setmyopic stable setstrategic-form game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Cooperative games (91A12) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cited in

(5)

• Maximal stable sets of two-player games
• Single-payoff farsighted stable sets in strategic games with dominant punishment strategies
• Matching with myopic and farsighted players
• Credible sets
• Axiomatization of the farsighted stable set and the (strong) rational expectations farsighted stable set

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