Theory of Moves
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Publication:4859934
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(30)- Long-term behavior in the theory of moves
- A model of agreements in strategic form games
- Axioms for the outcomes of negotiation in matrix games
- Bargaining over strategies of non-cooperative games
- Names for games: locating 2 2 games
- Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter?
- Fuzzy moves
- Every normal-form game has a Pareto-optimal nonmyopic equilibrium
- Equilibrium as compatibility of plans
- When autonomous agents model other agents: an appeal for altered judgment coupled with mouths, ears, and a little more tape
- Trust and cooperation from a fuzzy perspective
- Strength of preference in graph models for multiple-decision-maker conflicts
- Myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player strategic-form games
- Agreement through threats: The Northern Ireland case
- Decision making beyond arrow's “impossibility theorem,” with the analysis of effects of collusion and mutual attraction
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1309106 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1784406 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1844985 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7558435 (Why is no real title available?)
- Conflict resolution in competitive liberalized railway market: application of game theoretic concepts
- Ordinal games and generalized Nash and Stackelberg solutions
- Rational play in extensive-form games
- How lies induced cooperation in \textit{Golden Balls}: a game-theoretic analysis
- Escalation to conflict as an ongoing process: the case of July 1914
- Super-Nash performance
- Combining strength and uncertainty for preferences in the graph model for conflict resolution with multiple decision makers
- Mill's harm principle, rationality, and Pareto optimality in games
- Generalized metarationalities in the graph model for conflict resolution
- Relational dominant strategy equilibrium as a generalization of dominant strategy equilibrium in terms of a social psychological aspect of decision making
- Stubbornness, power, and equilibrium selection in repeated games with multiple equilibria
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