Strength of preference in graph models for multiple-decision-maker conflicts

DOI10.1016/j.amc.2005.11.109zbMath1125.90360OpenAlexW2026213374MaRDI QIDQ2506348

D. Marc Kilgour, Luai Hamouda, Keith William Hipel

Publication date: 28 September 2006

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2005.11.109

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50)

Related Items (15)

Initial state stability forn-decision-maker conflicts ⋮ Theory and application of conflict resolution with hybrid preference in colored graphs ⋮ Matrix representation and extension of coalition analysis in group decision support ⋮ Adaptive Systems Thinking in Integrated Water Resources Management with Insights into Conflicts over Water Exports ⋮ Attitudes and preferences: approaches to representing decision maker desires ⋮ Matrix representation of consensus and dissent stabilities in the graph model for conflict resolution ⋮ Mixed stabilities for analyzing opponents' heterogeneous behavior within the graph model for conflict resolution ⋮ Inverse engineering preferences in simple games ⋮ Multiple levels of preference in interactive strategic decisions ⋮ An integrated algebraic approach to conflict resolution with three-level preference ⋮ Combining strength and uncertainty for preferences in the graph model for conflict resolution with multiple decision makers ⋮ Matrix representation of stability definitions for the graph model for conflict resolution with reciprocal preference relations ⋮ Fuzzy levels of preference strength in a graph model with multiple decision makers ⋮ A matrix-based approach to searching colored paths in a weighted colored multidigraph ⋮ A matrix approach to status quo analysis in the graph model for conflict resolution

Cites Work

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• Impossibility of deception in a conflict among subjects with interdependent preference
• The graph model for conflict resolution with information-gap uncertainty in preferences.
• Logistics networks: a game theory application for solving the transshipment problem
• Non-cooperative games
• Relative Risk Aversion
• Theory of Moves
• Equilibrium points in n -person games

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