Stubbornness, power, and equilibrium selection in repeated games with multiple equilibria

DOI10.1007/S11238-006-9020-4zbMATH Open1137.91322OpenAlexW2012524168MaRDI QIDQ883204FDOQ883204

Authors: Kjell Hausken 

Publication date: 31 May 2007

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-006-9020-4

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zbMATH Keywords

conflictdiscountingrepeated gameequilibrium selectionequilibrium refinementpower indexstubbornness incentive

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

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• Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Two-Person Cooperative Games
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• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
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• Theory of Moves
• The battle of the sexes when the future is important
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• Assignment games, chromatic number, and exchange theory

Cited In (1)

• Game theoretic analysis of two-period-dependent degraded multistate reliability systems

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