Stubbornness, power, and equilibrium selection in repeated games with multiple equilibria

DOI10.1007/S11238-006-9020-4MaRDI QIDQ883204zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kjell Hausken

Publication date 31 May 2007

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-006-9020-4

zbMATH Keywords

conflictdiscountingrepeated gameequilibrium selectionequilibrium refinementpower indexstubbornness incentive

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3945821 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44372 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3614533 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• Assignment games, chromatic number, and exchange theory
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• The battle of the sexes when the future is important
• Theory of Moves
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

Cited in

(1)

• Game theoretic analysis of two-period-dependent degraded multistate reliability systems

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