On the irrelevance of risk attitudes in repeated two-outcome games

DOI10.1006/game.2000.0808zbMath0978.91010WikidataQ56502616 ScholiaQ56502616MaRDI QIDQ5931930

Jason M. Shachat, John Wooders

Publication date: 6 May 2001

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/7caadc67e8b519f08b67182bead330247f1e5898

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibrium; repeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

Related Items

Adolescents, cognitive ability, and minimax play, First-mover advantage in best-of series: an experimental comparison of role-assignment rules, Edgar Allan Poe's riddle: framing effects in repeated matching pennies games, Equilibrium play in matches: binary Markov games, Mixed strategy play and the minimax hypothesis, Behavior in strategic settings: evidence from a million rock-paper-scissors games, Blind stealing: experience and expertise in a mixed-strategy poker experiment, Exploitable actions of believers in the ``law of small numbers in repeated constant-sum games, Majoritarian Blotto contests with asymmetric battlefields: an experiment on apex games, Learning and equilibrium as useful approximations: accuracy of prediction on randomly selected constant sum games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games
• Mixed strategies in strictly competitive games: A further test of the minimax hypothesis
• Learning behavior in an experimental matching pennies game
• Finitely Repeated Games
• Nonmetric test of the minimax theory of two-person zerosum games.