Mixed strategies in strictly competitive games: A further test of the minimax hypothesis

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(92)90019-OMaRDI QIDQ1189704zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Amnon Rapoport, Richard B. Boebel

Publication date 27 September 1992

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(92)90019-O

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Measurement and performance in psychology (91E45)

Cites work

• Nonmetric test of the minimax theory of two-person zerosum games.

Cited in

(13)

• Learning and decision costs in experimental constant sum games
• Evidence for learning to learn behavior in normal form games
• Generality, repetition, and the role of descriptive learning models
• A generalized cognitive hierarchy model of games
• Predicting how people play games: A simple dynamic model of choice
• On the irrelevance of risk attitudes in repeated two-outcome games
• The development of randomization and deceptive behavior in mixed strategy games
• Predefined/prescribed-time convergence algorithm of nonconvex-nonconcave min-max optimization
• Cognitive load and mixed strategies: on brains and minimax
• Mixed strategy play and the minimax hypothesis
• Coordination through reputations: A laboratory experiment
• Minimax under pressure: the case of tennis
• Decisions in the basketball endgame: a downside of the three-point revolution

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