Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests

DOI10.2307/2951554zbMath0801.90136OpenAlexW2146841216MaRDI QIDQ5286047

Klaus M. Schmidt

Publication date: 29 June 1993

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/64133

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentreputationinfinitely repeated gamesdiscounted payoffssupergameFolk theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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