Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests

DOI10.2307/2951554MaRDI QIDQ5286047zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Klaus M. Schmidt

Publication date 29 June 1993

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/64133

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentreputationinfinitely repeated gamesdiscounted payoffssupergameFolk theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cited in

(27)

• Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts
• Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Note: a repeated one-player game of deception with discounting
• When are nonanonymous players negligible?
• The optimal degree of cooperation in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with side payments
• Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies
• Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests
• Optimal policy with credibility concerns
• Stubbornness, power, and equilibrium selection in repeated games with multiple equilibria
• Bargaining with imperfect commitment
• Quality distortions in vertical relations
• Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria
• (Bad) reputation in relational contracting
• Stochastic Control Approach to Reputation Games
• Bayesian repeated games and reputation
• Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information
• Commitment in first-price auctions
• Reputation games for undirected graphs
• Reputation effects
• Reputation effects in stochastic games with two long-lived players
• When is reputation bad?
• The emergence of cooperation through leadership
• Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring
• Reputation and perfection in repeated common interest games
• Reciprocity and cooperation in repeated coordination games: The principled-player approach
• Reputation and Commitment in Two-Person Repeated Games Without Discounting
• Replicator dynamics of reward \& reputation in public goods games

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