Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests
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Publication:5286047
DOI10.2307/2951554zbMATH Open0801.90136OpenAlexW2146841216MaRDI QIDQ5286047FDOQ5286047
Authors: Klaus M. Schmidt 
Publication date: 29 June 1993
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/64133
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- Optimal policy with credibility concerns
- Stochastic Control Approach to Reputation Games
- Quality distortions in vertical relations
- The emergence of cooperation through leadership
- When are nonanonymous players negligible?
- Bayesian repeated games and reputation
- Commitment in first-price auctions
- The optimal degree of cooperation in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with side payments
- Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests
- Bargaining with imperfect commitment
- Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information
- Reputation games for undirected graphs
- (Bad) reputation in relational contracting
- Stubbornness, power, and equilibrium selection in repeated games with multiple equilibria
- Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Reciprocity and cooperation in repeated coordination games: The principled-player approach
- Reputation and Commitment in Two-Person Repeated Games Without Discounting
- Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies
- Reputation effects in stochastic games with two long-lived players
- Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring
- Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts
- Reputation effects
- Note: a repeated one-player game of deception with discounting
- Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria
- When is reputation bad?
- Replicator dynamics of reward \& reputation in public goods games
- Reputation and perfection in repeated common interest games
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