Reputation and Commitment in Two-Person Repeated Games Without Discounting
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Publication:4859518
DOI10.2307/2171775zbMath0841.90140OpenAlexW2115943283MaRDI QIDQ4859518
Jonathan P. Thomas, Martin W. Cripps
Publication date: 7 January 1996
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/16389/1/16389.pdf
incomplete informationreputationfolk theoremtwo-person repeated gamestwo-sided uncertaintyno discounting
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