Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.01.012zbMATH Open1330.91029OpenAlexW2067465949MaRDI QIDQ894041FDOQ894041

Alp E. Atakan, Mehmet Ekmekci

Publication date: 23 November 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.012

Recommendations

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zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesreputationimperfect monitoringfinite automatonlong-run playersequal discount factor

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
• Reputation in Long-Run Relationships
• Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information
• Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests
• A folk theorem for stochastic games
• Reputation and dynamic Stackelberg leadership in infinitely repeated games
• Reputation and Experimentation in Repeated Games With Two Long-Run Players
• Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
• Simple Bounds on the Value of a Reputation
• Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Reputation and perfection in repeated common interest games
• Reputation in perturbed repeated games
• Reputation and Commitment in Two-Person Repeated Games Without Discounting

Cited In (13)

• The Fragmentation of Reputation
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Selloffs, bailouts, and feedback: can asset markets inform policy?
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
• Order of limits in reputations
• Reputation with one-sided monitoring: ignorance as a commitment device
• Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts
• A note on reputation: more on the chain-store paradox
• A reputation for honesty
• A two-sided reputation result with long-run players
• Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games
• Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games
• A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)

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