Reputation with one-sided monitoring: ignorance as a commitment device

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.04.017MaRDI QIDQ1668267zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Daniel Monte

Publication date 3 September 2018

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.04.017

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentone-sided monitoringreputation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring
• On "Reputation" Refinements with Heterogeneous Beliefs
• Reputation and the flow of information in repeated games
• Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player

Cites work

• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
• Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Reputation and perfection in repeated common interest games
• Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring
• Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests
• Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information
• Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
• Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions and Observable Payoffs

Cited in

(7)

• Reputation and perfection in repeated common interest games
• Reputation with noisy precommitment
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1487900 (Why is no real title available?)
• Reputation in long-run relationships
• Occurrence of deception under the oversight of a regulator having reputation concerns
• Reputation and the flow of information in repeated games
• Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring

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