Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions and Observable Payoffs
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Publication:4016718
DOI10.1287/moor.17.1.200zbMath0763.90112OpenAlexW2100412744MaRDI QIDQ4016718
Publication date: 16 January 1993
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/0963b37e791b1f32b11a9f60a4046669395aa7df
Related Items (22)
Correlated equilibria of two person repeated games with random signals ⋮ Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations ⋮ Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring ⋮ Reputation with one-sided monitoring: ignorance as a commitment device ⋮ Lower equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games with non- observable actions ⋮ What you get is what you see: cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs ⋮ Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring. ⋮ Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. ⋮ Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals ⋮ Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation. ⋮ An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information ⋮ On the equilibrium payoffs set of two player repeated games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ Repeated Games with Complete Information ⋮ Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games ⋮ The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs ⋮ A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network ⋮ General properties of long-run supergames ⋮ Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring ⋮ Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games ⋮ Limit Equilibrium Payoffs in Stochastic Games ⋮ Internal correlation in repeated games ⋮ A folk theorem for minority games
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