Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring

DOI10.1006/JETH.1997.2313zbMATH Open0888.90177OpenAlexW2036659345MaRDI QIDQ1371135FDOQ1371135

Authors: Tadashi Sekiguchi 

Publication date: 28 October 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/fa43f59bdc31d759d52b18ae80cba19683f22eef

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zbMATH Keywords

prisoner's dilemmarepeated gamesprivate monitoringnearly efficient sequential equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Lower equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games with non- observable actions
• An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
• Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions and Observable Payoffs
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
• On the theory of repeated games with private information. I: Anti-folk theorem without communication
• Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting
• On sustaining cooperation without public observations

Cited In (53)

• Robust relational contracts with subjective performance evaluation
• Resolution of the \(n\)-person prisoners' dilemma by Kalai's preplay negotiation procedure
• Repeated games with complete information
• Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
• Repeated coordination with private learning
• Strategic buyers and privately observed prices
• An efficiency result in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game under costly observation with nonpublic randomization
• Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games
• Efficient outcomes in repeated games with limited monitoring
• Efficiency in games with Markovian private information
• Strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships under observation errors in repeated prisoner's dilemma game
• Information can wreck cooperation: a counterpoint to Kandori (1992)
• Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players
• A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring
• Efficiency in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
• Plausible cooperation
• A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games
• Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags
• Efficiency results in \(N\) player games with imperfect private monitoring
• Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: experiments
• Moral hazard and private monitoring
• Boundedly rational quasi-Bayesian learning in coordination games with imperfect monitoring
• Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring
• A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
• Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring
• Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
• Characterizing belief-free review-strategy equilibrium payoffs under conditional independence
• Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies
• Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: \(n\)-player games
• Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring.
• Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring
• Optimal collusion with internal contracting
• Collusion in dynamic Bertrand oligopoly with correlated private signals and communication
• Conditions for the existence of zero-determinant strategies under observation errors in repeated games
• Attaining efficiency with imperfect public monitoring and one-sided Markov adverse selection
• Private monitoring games and decisions under uncertainty
• The analogical foundations of cooperation
• Approximate efficiency in repeated games with correlated private signals
• Order of limits in reputations
• A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games
• The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs
• The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
• Private monitoring and communication in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• On failing to cooperate when monitoring is private
• Private monitoring in auctions
• Communication and Cooperation in repeated games
• Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
• Instability of belief-free equilibria
• On sustaining cooperation without public observations
• The folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma with endogenous private monitoring
• When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?

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