Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
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Publication:1371135
DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2313zbMath0888.90177OpenAlexW2036659345MaRDI QIDQ1371135
Publication date: 28 October 1997
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/fa43f59bdc31d759d52b18ae80cba19683f22eef
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Cites Work
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