Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
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Cites work
- An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
- Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
- Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
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- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions and Observable Payoffs
Cited in
(53)- When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?
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- Strategic buyers and privately observed prices
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- Efficient outcomes in repeated games with limited monitoring
- Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games
- An efficiency result in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game under costly observation with nonpublic randomization
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- Strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships under observation errors in repeated prisoner's dilemma game
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- Private monitoring in auctions
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- Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
- Instability of belief-free equilibria
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- Resolution of the \(n\)-person prisoners' dilemma by Kalai's preplay negotiation procedure
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