Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring

DOI10.3982/TE1200MaRDI QIDQ4586004zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Francesco Nava, Michele Piccione

Publication date 11 September 2018

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te1200

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationlocal monitoringnetworksrepeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Recommendations

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Cited in

(9)

• Cooperation in partly observable networked markets
• Exclusive intermediation in unobservable networks
• A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network
• Cooperative networks with robust private monitoring
• Trust in cohesive communities
• Logit Dynamics with Concurrent Updates for Local Interaction Games
• Approximate efficiency in repeated games with side-payments and correlated signals
• Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring
• Simple relational contracts and the dynamics of social capital

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