Cooperative networks with robust private monitoring

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2019.104974zbMath1430.91069OpenAlexW2990317776WikidataQ126642024 ScholiaQ126642024MaRDI QIDQ2288535

Russell Toth, Maximilian Mihm

Publication date: 20 January 2020

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.104974

zbMATH Keywords

networkstriadic closurebelief-free equilibriumlocal monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Games involving graphs (91A43) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Uses Software

• GenLouvain

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Networks of relations and word-of-mouth communication
• Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence
• The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
• A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
• Trust in cohesive communities
• Community Structure in Time-Dependent, Multiscale, and Multiplex Networks
• Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
• Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring
• Cooperation with Network Monitoring
• The Economic Returns to Social Interaction: Experimental Evidence from Microfinance
• Collective dynamics of ‘small-world’ networks
• Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
• Complex Networks