A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma

DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2774zbMath1008.91002OpenAlexW2055637434MaRDI QIDQ1604520

Jeffrey C. Ely, Juuso Välimäki

Publication date: 4 July 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2774

zbMATH Keywords

payoffssequential equilibriumprivate monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (44)

Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play ⋮ When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff? ⋮ A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring ⋮ Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games ⋮ Private monitoring in auctions ⋮ Construction of subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in repeated games ⋮ The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games ⋮ Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: experiments ⋮ The robustness of zero-determinant strategies in iterated prisoner's dilemma games ⋮ What you get is what you see: cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs ⋮ Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring ⋮ Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring ⋮ The folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma with endogenous private monitoring ⋮ HELPING BEHAVIOR IN LARGE SOCIETIES ⋮ Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring ⋮ The analogical foundations of cooperation ⋮ Learning from private information in noisy repeated games ⋮ Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence ⋮ Characterizing belief-free review-strategy equilibrium payoffs under conditional independence ⋮ Approximate efficiency in repeated games with correlated private signals ⋮ Set-valued games and mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted supergames ⋮ The efficiency of bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes under subjective evaluations ⋮ Repeated Games with Complete Information ⋮ Instability of belief-free equilibria ⋮ Learning a population distribution ⋮ Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games ⋮ The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs ⋮ Optimal collusion with internal contracting ⋮ A folk theorem for stochastic games with private almost-perfect monitoring ⋮ Efficiency results in \(N\) player games with imperfect private monitoring ⋮ Cooperative networks with robust private monitoring ⋮ Folk theorem with communication ⋮ ASYMMETRY OF CUSTOMER LOSS AND RECOVERY UNDER ENDOGENOUS PARTNERSHIPS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE* ⋮ A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games ⋮ Reactive strategies: an inch of memory, a mile of equilibria ⋮ Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ Behavioral theory of repeated prisoner's dilemma: generous tit-for-tat strategy ⋮ Recall and private monitoring ⋮ Plausible cooperation ⋮ Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring ⋮ Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring ⋮ The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring ⋮ Repeated games with almost-public monitoring ⋮ Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring.

Cites Work

• On the theory of repeated games with private information. I: Anti-folk theorem without communication
• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• Lower equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games with non- observable actions
• Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
• Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring
• The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
• Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
• How much common belief is necessary for a convention?
• Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information
• On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
• Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies

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