Learning from private information in noisy repeated games
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Publication:643254
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.003zbMath1255.91055OpenAlexW3122822343MaRDI QIDQ643254
Yuichi Yamamoto, Drew Fudenberg
Publication date: 28 October 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:9962008
incomplete informationrepeated gamefolk theorembelief-free equilibriumpublic monitoringperfect public equilibriumex-post equilibrium
Related Items (6)
Markov stationary equilibria in stochastic supermodular games with imperfect private and public information ⋮ The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring ⋮ Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence ⋮ Repeated coordination with private learning ⋮ Maximizing survival time in a random walk on an interval ⋮ Imperfect public monitoring with a fear of signal distortion
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