A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Unknown Payoff Distributions

DOI10.1111/J.1468-0262.2005.00589.XzbMATH Open1145.91318OpenAlexW2106518254MaRDI QIDQ5489079FDOQ5489079

Thomas Wiseman

Publication date: 25 September 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00589.x

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zbMATH Keywords

learningrepeated gamesfolk theorempayoff uncertainty

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cited In (9)

• Repeated coordination with private learning
• Stochastic Superiority Equilibrium in Game Theory
• Reputation and exogenous private learning
• Strategic information exchange
• Recent studies of agent incentives in Internet resource allocation and pricing
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Dynamic coordination via organizational routines
• Learning from private information in noisy repeated games
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