A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Unknown Payoff Distributions

DOI10.1111/J.1468-0262.2005.00589.XMaRDI QIDQ5489079zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Thomas Wiseman

Publication date 25 September 2006

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00589.x

zbMATH Keywords

learningrepeated gamesfolk theorempayoff uncertainty

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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