Repeated coordination with private learning
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Publication:2220921
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105106zbMath1457.91065arXiv1809.00051OpenAlexW2891340194MaRDI QIDQ2220921
Tetsuya Hoshino, Pathikrit Basu, Omer Tamuz, Kalyan Chatterjee
Publication date: 25 January 2021
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.00051
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