A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games
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Publication:1007331
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.07.005zbMath1158.91320OpenAlexW2088743496MaRDI QIDQ1007331
Publication date: 20 March 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.07.005
Related Items (10)
Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play ⋮ A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring ⋮ Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring ⋮ Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring ⋮ Learning from private information in noisy repeated games ⋮ Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags ⋮ Characterizing belief-free review-strategy equilibrium payoffs under conditional independence ⋮ Instability of belief-free equilibria ⋮ Learning a population distribution ⋮ Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal
Cites Work
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